Doesn’t the Talmudic story of the tanur of Akhnai teach us that ratzon Hashem is not particularly relevant in halachic disputes?
Joseph
From: Joseph Kaplan Tue, 19 Sep 2023 18:56:27
Doesn?t the Talmudic story of the tanur of Akhnai teach us that ratzon
Hashem is not particularly relevant in halachic disputes?Joseph
------------------------------
The commentators take a much more nuanced view towards the relevance of
ratzon haShem in halachic disputes. Sefer Hachinuch (496:3) in his comments
on Bava Metzia 59b, acknowledges that halachic protocols themselves
override the desire for following the true halacha. But he makes it clear
that identifying the true halacha is the initial goal the Sages strive to
reach.
Drashos HaRan adds that the incident of the tanur of Ackhnai represents an
extremely rare aberration where the majority opinion proved mistaken, yet
which we should nevertheless follow, despite the resultant damage done to
our souls. This, he explains, is because in the extremely rare instance
where the majority of Sages reach the wrong conclusion, the downside of
that damage is outweighed by the benefit of the nation uniformly following
the sages' conclusions.
We understand that the darchei pesak do lead us to the true ratzon haShem
in the vast majority of cases, and it is very relevant.
Earlier commentators are entirely dismissive of the possibility that the
Sages could be disregarding the ratzon haShem. Rabbeinu Nissim Gaon on
Berachos 19b gives two explanations for why the sages disregarded the Bas
Kol. One is that the Bas Kol was NOT saying that Rebbi Eliezer's minority
opinion was the ratzon haShem. The majotity opinion was correct. The
Bas Kol was only announcing that in all OTHER cases Rebbi Eliezer's opinion
was correct or nearly so. (Perhaps he means the Bas Kol was standing up for
R. Eliezer's honor, even though he was wrong in this case.)
In his second answer, Rabbeunu Nissim Gaon asserts that the Bas Kol was
actually lying. The true halacha actually was as the majority decided.
Hashem sent the Bas Kol specifically to test the Sages whether they would
forgo the principle of “It is not any longer in Heaven,” similar to the
test posed by Hashem in allowing a false prophet to ostensibly perform
miracles.
(Apparently, this is also how the Rambam would explain the phenomenon of
Hashem releasing the Bas Kol opinionating on whose halachic stand is
correct.)
Zvi Lampel
Al rishon rishon.... Starting with the initial question about whether
a judgment of beis din is necessarily an expression of Retzon haBorei
we got to pesaq.
I would argue that pesaq is different in kind. Because if it's not a mesechtes
Horiyos kind of situation, we could say, kulam meiRo'eh Echad. (Chagiga 3b
<https://www.sefaria.org/Chagigah.3b.3-4>\). Or, "eilu va'eilu divrei
Elokim Chaim".
To me it would seem that when both shitos are valid, they are both Divine
Will.
That is different than asking about a particular person losing money in
BD that he didn't actually owe the other party. (Or worse.)
At least, according to everyone below but RNG, that would work. How
he understands that gemara as well as the words "eilu va'eilu"
requires discussion. Or maybe someone could write a whole book on the
subject. <wink>
(See https://amzn.to/48z1n0f, Understanding Machlokes, by the same R
Zvi Lampel. A/k/a The Dynamics of Dispute, plus 30 more years of ameilus.)
Whether one takes eilu va'eily or kulam meiro'eh echad literally seems
to depend on how one reads the tanur [shel] Akhenai story. I once
blogged my retelling of the Ency Talmudit's list of shitos on the subject:
<https://aspaqlaria.aishdas.org/2005/01/08/legislative-authority-of-bas-qol>
The problem is that while we didn't follow the bas qol in this story, we
do follow the bas qol that said "eilu va'eilu... vehalakhah keBeis Hillel."
So VIDC -- vos is der chiluq (as RYGB used to pose in Avodah's early days) --
between the two cases?
1- Rav Nissim Gaon (Berachos 19a), opinion I: The bas qol said
"halachah k'moso b'chol makom". As a general rule, the halachah is like
R' Eliezer, but not here. The halachic conclusion does not contradict
the bas qol, and it's even possible that the BQ caused them to reach
their decision.
2- Ibid, opinion II: The bas qol was only a test for the sages. Again,
normally BQ would have halachic power.
3- Tosfos (Eiruvin 6b) I: The bas qol was only for the kavod of R'
Eliezer, who called down the opinion of Shamayim. BQ does NOT have
halachic authority.
#3 is only possible (assuming that G-d doesn't lie) by saying that R'
Eliezer and R' Yehoshua were in an eilu va'eilu situation -- both were
right. Therefore, to show R' Eliezer respect, G-d asserts that R
Eliezer isn't wrong even though the halachah is like R' Yehoshua. In
short, exactly the same point made by the BH vs BS story.
4- Tosfos II: There is a difference between whether the bas qol runs
counter to metahalachah (normal halachic process), or in accordance
with it. Bas qol can confirm a ruling, but not run counter to normal
halachic process. Metahalachically, we follow BH because they are the
majority. The BQ only confirms that fact.
(Why did it need confirmation? Probably because this is the first
generation that the Sanhedrin was in exile, and because BS were
generally considered the sharper group. Therefore there was a crisis in
confidence in rejecting BS's opinion without word from the Chamber of
Hewn Wood.)
5- Or Samei'ach (Yesodei HaTorah 9:4): There is a distinction between
whether the bas qol is clarifying a particular halachah and whether it
speaks of a person's ruling. In the first case, BQ is certainly
not followed -- metahalachah is the G-d-given means of creating new
halachah. (cf Temurah 16:1, where the prophet Yehoshua refuses to
retrieve lost halachos via prophecy.) In the second, we do follow
Beis Hillel, as per the BQ. (Although R' Yehoshua disagreed about
this use of bas qol as well.)
#5 appears to be nearly identical to #4, but with the added statement
that given two true answers (speaking of one of two extant rulings),
i.e. metahalachah allows one to follow either, BK can be followed. His
conclusion is that even had BH and BS been of equal number, the
halakhah would still be like BH.
In short: RNG gives authority to BQ to override halachic process, and
the Achnai story's bas qol is a special case for two different reasons.
Tosafos and the OS agree that BQ has less authority than metahalachah,
and possibly even no halachic say at all.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
Thank you Reb Micha for plugging my sefer. It's all the more appreciated in
view of the fact you disagree with me on some of the issues, such as eilu
v-eilu. It shows that you are a true practitioner of Widening Your Tent.
https://amzn.to/2JRxnDF
With that introduction, here's a disagreement.
RMB:
1- Rav Nissim Gaon (Berachos 19a-b), opinion I: The bas qol said
"halachah k'moso b'chol makom". As a general rule, the halachah is like
R' Eliezer, but not here. The halachic conclusion does not contradict
the bas qol, and it's even possible that the BQ caused them to reach
their decision.2- Ibid, opinion II: The bas qol was only a test for the sages. Again,
normally BQ would have halachic power.... RNG gives authority to BQ to override halachic process, and
the Achnai story's bas qol is a special case for two different reasons.
....
ZL: I don't think so. Rav Nissim Gaon explicitly explains that his
explanations are in response to the problem that the majority view was so
buttressed by proofs that R. Eliezer had no way of countering them (so how
could a bas kol disagree),
In the first answer the bas kol was not making a halachic statement at all.
In the second answer the bas kol was as illegitimate as a false prophet,
because there is no place for a bas kol in the halachic process. "The Torah
of Hashem is complete, and already given to us at Sinai, and He let us know
that He would switch over not one statement of it. Our Torah lacks nothing
and has no doubts for which we would need a proof from Heaven.
In other words, according to RNG, the human halachic protocol discovers the
true intent of the Torah (read, the ratzon haSheim), and any bas kol
disagreeing with it is a miscontrance of its intent.
Zvi Lampel
RZLampel deals with a number of texts in his sefer that to me
would more literally say that any of the valid shitos are Retzon haBorei.
In general discussion, we tend to repeat the same three, at our peril:
- Tanur [shel] Akhnai
- Eilu va'Eilu (Eiruvin 13b)
- Kulam miRo'eh Echad nitnum
For example, the Ritva on Eilu vaEilu
<https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.13b.10?p2=Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2>:
Eilu vaEilu divrei Elokim Chayim: The French Rabbanim z"l...
Interruption: This is a school of Baalei Tosafos, no?
The French Rabbanim z"l asked: How is it possible that these and those
are both DEC, and this one prohibits and this permits? And they answer,
for when Moshe went up leMarom to recieve the Torah, they taught him...
Interruption: "Her'u"? "They taught him"? Not "He"? I thought the whole
revelation was directly from HQBH!
[W]hen Moshe went up leMarom to recieve the Torah, they taught him
49 panim (facets) to prohibit and 49 panim to permit.
And he asked HQBH about this, and said, "This should be given to
Chachmei Yisrael who are in every generation, and the hakhra'ah
should be like them.
This is correct according to the Derash, and in the Derekh haEmes
there is a ta'am sod in the matter.
So the Ritva, on the level of the Derash, appears to be saying that
Retzon haBorei is for us to do as our Chakhamim pasqen. Not either
shitah specifically.
Also, "panim" is an interesting word. It tends to be mistranslated in
this context as though the word was "derakhim". "Panim" sounds *to me*
more like there are different ways of looking at it, and each way would
show a different facet / face. And Hashem wants us to pasqen based on
how we, as we exist in that generation, are looking at the topic.
RMB:
Well, to be accurate, I said I was summarizing a list in Encyc. Talmudis
"Bas Qol". Which means that I didn't really get a chance to read the
sources BEFORE someone told me what they said, to form my own blank-slate
opinion.
1- Rav Nissim Gaon (Berachos 19a-b), opinion I: The bas qol said
"halachah k'moso b'chol makom". As a general rule, the halachah is like
R' Eliezer, but not here. The halachic conclusion does not contradict
the bas qol, and it's even possible that the BQ caused them to reach
their decision.
2- Ibid, opinion II: The bas qol was only a test for the sages. Again,
normally BQ would have halachic power.
... RNG gives authority to BQ to override halachic process, and
the Achnai story's bas qol is a special case for two different reasons.
....
...
In the first answer the bas kol was not making a halachic statement at all.
How is "halakhah kemoso bekhol maqom" not a halachic statement? As I
explained it, it's not a statement about the specific halakhah of
whether tanu akhnai is a keli when assembled. If that's what you mean,
I would agree.
But this answer is saying the reason why we ignore the BQ is because
its statement wasn't about the tanur! And what does that imply about
a situation where the BQ *did* give a pesaq in that case?
In the second answer the bas kol was as illegitimate as a false prophet,
because there is no place for a bas kol in the halachic process....
Are you saying that the tannaim in the beis medrash were fooled by a bas
qol sheqer? A navi sheqer is one you know is outright lying, because such
a nevu'ah couldn't be. And so I would take it that R Nissim Gaon is also
saying that such a BQ, one that pasqens agains the rabbim, couldn't be.
And therefore I understand the ET's reading of R Nissim Gaon, that both
answers are based on the idea that the BQ is not giving the halakhah
in this case. In the first answer, the BQ spoke up about the rest of R
Eliezer's pesaqim, for his kavod. In the second, the BQ was sent even
though it was false, to test the rabbim. But there too it wasn't really
meant as pesaq.
And RNG giving two ways in which the BQ wasn't paqening in order to
justify not following it, it would seem that if the machloqes couldn't
be resolved by humans, we would follow the BQ. As what happened with
eilu va'eilu.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
RZLampel deals with a number of texts in his sefer that to me
would more literally say that any of the valid shitos are Retzon haBorei.
ZL: Some background for the reader: RMB and I have a long-standing
disagreement over the meaning of "Eilu v'Eilu Divrei Elokim Chaim." He
endorses what he refers here to a reading of the sources that "to me would
more literally say that any of the valid shitos are Retzon haBorei," and
attributes to them the idea that the verdicts of both sides of a machlokes
of Chazal are true, despite being contradictory.
I maintain otherwise: That the rishonim and acharonim hold that in any
given case, Hashem has one verdict in mind. It is Chazal's goal and
obligation to discover it through human reason. And with virtually no
exceptions, their final decision, upon following the rules of pesak,
successfully identifies that verdict. The rishonim and acharonim maintain
that contradictions cannot both be true, and explain "Eilu v'Eilu"
accordingly. They say the adage means to attribute values other than truth
to the words of all proponents of the machlokes, such as that they
represent sincere attempts to analyze the Torah. And/or that all the
factors/considerations (panim) that the proponents base their conclusions
on in a given case are valid, albeit that some point to one conclusion and
some to an opposite conclusion. For, in each case, there is one ratzon
Hashem based upon which factors are the overriding ones in number and
strength.
RMB:
In general discussion, we tend to repeat the same three, at our peril:
- Tanur [shel] Akhnai
- Eilu va'Eilu (Eiruvin 13b)
- Kulam miRo'eh Echad nitnum
ZL: "at our peril"?
Here's another pertinent source. Rebbi Yochanan (Sanhedrin 34a) teaches
that when tallying the votes of the Sanhedrin, if two dayanim darshan the
same point of reasoning (ta'am) from two different pesukim, it is tallied
as one vote, not two. Why? Abbaye explains: Because Hashem assigned each of
His ta'amim to one drash alone. Whereas one [feature of a] posuk can
produce many ta'amim, multiple pesukim were not designed to teach the same
one ta'am. Rashi elaborates: we only count the vote as one because one of
those pesukim is not meant to support this [ta'am], for we have it as well
established that two mikraos were not written for one ta'am; therefore one
of the dayanim is /in error./ (D'chad me'hanach kra'ei lav l'hachi assa,
d'kayma lan lo nich't'vu shnei mikra'os l'ta'am echad, /hilkach chad
mi'nayhu m'ta'a ta'i/.)
In other words, Hashem had exclusive meanings in mind when he devised the
posuk, and any other meanings are not His intended meanings of that posuk.
And therefore, if two disagree over the posuk's meaning--even if they agree
to the halachic outcomes--one of those dayanim is necessarily wrong.
RMB:
For example, the Ritva on Eilu vaEilu
<https://www.sefaria.org/Eruvin.13b.10?p2=Ritva_on_Eruvin.13b.2>:
Eilu vaEilu divrei Elokim Chayim: The French Rabbanim z"l...Interruption: This is a school of Baalei Tosafos, no?
ZL: Tosafos Shantz, too, on Eiduyos 1:5 (early 13th century) cites the
idea in the name of the French Rabbanim, and Tosafos Rabbeynu Peretz of
Corbiel (late 13th century) cites it in the name of his rebbi, Rav Yechiel
of Paris, but expresses dissatisfaction with it.
RMB:
The French Rabbanim z"l asked: How is it possible that these and those
are both DEC, and this one prohibits and this permits? And they answer,
for when Moshe went up leMarom to recieve the Torah, they taught him...Interruption: "Her'u"? "They taught him"? Not "He"? I thought the
whole revelation was directly from HQBH!
ZL: Megillah 19b, has a similar passage, which indeed states "/sheh'har'a'
hu HKBH/ l"Moshe,'' that HKBH showed them to Moshe, with "them" referring
to all future dikdukay Torah, v'dikdukay Soferim, u'mah sheh'Soferim asidim
l'chadesh, although it does not explicitly refer to machlokos, to the 49
panim behind each of the opposing halachic conclusions, or to "eilu
v'eilu."
However, the Drashos HaRan interprets "dikdukei Soferim'' as the future
machlokos of Chazal (although still not mentioning the 49 panim to each
side concept). Rashi interprets "dikdukei Soferim'' differently, as the
inferences the "acharonim" made from the mishna of the "rishonim.")
In the introduction to his Mishnah commentary, Tosafos Yom Tov (1579-1654)
emphasizes that Megillah 19b does /not/ say that HKBH ``taught" or
"handed over" to Moshe all future dikdukay Torah and dikdukei Soferim, but
only sheh'har'a'hu /showed/ them to him, without allowing him to hand them
over to the people. (Although "hora'ah" indicates a halachic teaching,
"her'u" is "He showed." )
In Drasha #3, the Ran cites another teaching of Chazal and says they
darshaned that "even the words of he who /did not reach the emes/," were
all told to Moshe b'Sinai." (Still without mentioning the concept of 49
panim to each side, and not being as clear as the Tosefos Yom Tov about
whether Moshe transmitted this information to the people.) Explicitly
working with the premises that (a) In any given case there is one true
halachic reality, and contradictory halachos cannot exist, and (b) Hashem
would not state that a falsehood is true; and evidently assuming the
premises that (c) It was not "they" but Hashem by Whom both the emes shita
and the sheker shita were told to Moshe, and (d) Hashem did not identify
the false shittos as such, the Ran proposes that although Hashem revealed
the future machlokos to Moshe, He did not reveal which shita was the emes.
RMB:
[W]hen Moshe went up leMarom to recieve the Torah,...
ZL: Rashi on Menachos 29b,--the passage that states that Moshe was
unaware of a halacha that Rabbi Akiva stated in his name--points out that
this occurred before it was told to Moshe. After all, the Gemara said this
happened "when Moshe went up leMarom /to receive/ the Torah." Here, too,
the malachim showing to Moshe all conflicting panim that exist in halachic
decisions is described as occurring "when Moshe went up leMarom /to
receive/ the Torah," so it follows that this occurred before Hashem taught
him the Torah,
RMB:
"panim" is an interesting word. It tends to be mistranslated in
this context as though the word was "derakhim". "Panim" sounds *to me*
more like there are different ways of looking at it, and each way would
show a different facet / face. And Hashem wants us to pasqen based on
how we, as we exist in that generation, are looking at the topic.
ZL: I recognize your emphasis on "sounds *to me* more like..." But why not
defer to Rashi (Sanhedrin 93b) who defines it differently, namely as
"ra'yos," proofs or supports one presents for his halachic conclusions." In
other words, the various sevaros, arguments and considerations that are
pertinent, and must be weighed, to arrive at the correct ruling in a given
situation.
Maharal (Gur ryeh, Shmos 31:18 os 9)--on Rashi who comments, "Moshe heard
mipi haGevurah, and both of them together reviewed and taught the
halacha"--states,
This is a deep concept. Every single statement in the Torah's words /must
be so/...Hashem Himself would review the halachos with Moshe...to show how
it is necessary, based upon Hashem's wisdom. Therefore it says they learned
the halacha together [with Hashem convincing Moshe of the necessity of the
halacha].
This sounds to me more like that the halacha HKBH taught Moshe was one way
that "must be so" and not the other.
See how this works (though not exclusive to my take) with Brachos 63b:
"Hashem spoke to Moshe panim el panim as a man would speak to his friend"
(Shemos 33:11)--Said Rebbi Yitzchak, HKBH said to Moshe, "Moshe, I and you
will explain panim b'halacha." Some say, HKBH said to Moshe, "Moshe, just
as I explained panim to you, so shall you explain panim to Yisrael."
In his Hebrew translation of the Judeo-Arabic Mevo HaTalmud by Rav Shmuel
ben Chofni Gaon, S. Abramson (Sinai 85, pp. 193-218) renders, by the words
penn and panim, the author’s reference to scenarios or cases. So this would
mean that the angels, concerning each commandment in the Torah, showed
Moshe forty-nine scenarios that, because of the particular element in each
one, should be ruled permitted, and forty-nine scenarios each with a
particular element that effects prohibition. The different scenarios and
their rulings illustrated how different circumstances would affect
the pesak. This would be similar to how the Mishnah utilizes scenarios to
illustrate applications of halacha, from which the Gemora deduces the
implicit abstract principles.
RMB:
And Hashem wants us to pasqen based on how we, as we exist in that
generation, are looking at the topic.
ZL: If this means that in different generations the correct halachic
conclusion may be different because there are different circumstances, I
agree. And if the chachamim disagree over which factors in the new
circumstances are the overriding ones, HKBH trusts that the majority will
discover the truth.
RMB:
"Her'u"? "They taught him"? Not "He"? I thought the whole revelation was
directly from HQBH!
Perhaps it is lav davka, and "they" means Hashem (after all, He is the
ultimate source of all). But if we are to take this davka, that t this time
it was not Hashem but only the (ministering) angels who did this, then the
teaching of the French Rabbanim (who of course must be consistent with the
Gemara) would either mean that Hashem repeated what the angels did, or that
what the angels did was different from what Hashem did. The most obvious
difference would be that while Hashem told Moshe the different conclusions
future chachamim would come to, only the angels told Moshe the 49 panim to
each side. And indeed, what the melachim did was not part of
the revelation, which was directly from HKBH. That leads me to an
interesting take on the French Rabbanim's concept.
We are familiar with Aggadtas that depict the ministering angels in the
role of contravening Hashem's desires with opposing viewpoints--objecting
to the creation of Man, wanting to say shira at krias Yam Suf, poskening in
Beis Din she'Lemalya differently from HKBH, etc. (Looking up the word
"mal'ach in the sefer Otzar Haggadah, I found 23 such Aggadta.) One of the
best-known of these is the Aggadta that portrays the ministering angels as
objecting to giving the Torah to Moshe. I suggest that this is the
undercurrent theme of this account of the angels barraging Moshe with 49
reasons for the halacha to be one way and 49 reasons for it to be the other
way.
Moshe Rabbeynu and Klal Yisrael were anxiously anticipating
finally receiving a Toras Emes. The Avos, who were able to discern the
halacha through their own reasoning, were no longer with us. Finally,
Hashem was about to reveal to Moshe the absolute truth about the world and
how we are to behave in it.
The ministering angels, however, were against this. So when Moshe ascended
Sinai, before receiving the Torah, they tried to convince him that there is
no point in accepting it. They argued that even with the Torah and its
"textbook cases," truth will not be obtainable. "B'kol davar v'davar," in
real life, situations will arrive that are complicated. there still will be
unclarity--49 reasons to say mutar and 49 reasons to say assur.
So Moshe asked Hashem about this concern. And Hashem replied that the
angels are wrong. True, there will be innumerable scenarios that are not
explicitly addressed in the Torah, and there will be a plethora of valid
Torah reasons to say one way as well as the other. And indeed, initially
there will be some sages who say the halacha should be one way, and some
who say it should be the other way. But Hashem assured Moshe that the
Chachamim of every generation, through their careful analysis and weighing
the factors quantitatively and qualitatively, and through following the
majority opinion, will be able to discern the true halacha He intended.
And he asked HQBH about this, and said, "This should be given to
Chachmei Yisrael who are in every generation, and the hakhra'ah
should be like them.This is correct according to the Derash, and in the Derekh haEmes
there is a ta'am sod in the matter.So the Ritva, on the level of the Derash, appears to be saying that
Retzon haBorei is for us to do as our Chakhamim pasqen. Not either
shitah specifically.
ZL: Or, as I take it, because Hashem trusts the chachamim to accurately be
machria which of the angel-revealed factors/considerations are the
overriding ones in the particular case at hand, thereby determining His
actual ratzon.
Zvi Lampel
Here's another pertinent source. Rebbi Yochanan (Sanhedrin 34a) teaches
that when tallying the votes of the Sanhedrin, if two dayanim darshan the
same point of reasoning (ta'am) from two different pesukim, it is tallied
as one vote, not two. Why? Abbaye explains: Because Hashem assigned each of
His ta'amim to one drash alone. Whereas one [feature of a] posuk can
produce many ta'amim, multiple pesukim were not designed to teach the same
one ta'am. Rashi elaborates: we only count the vote as one because one of
those pesukim is not meant to support this [ta'am], for we have it as well
established that two mikraos were not written for one ta'am; therefore one
of the dayanim is /in error./ (D'chad me'hanach kra'ei lav l'hachi assa,
d'kayma lan lo nich't'vu shnei mikra'os l'ta'am echad, /hilkach chad
mi'nayhu m'ta'a ta'i/.)
In other words, Hashem had exclusive meanings in mind when he devised the
posuk, and any other meanings are not His intended meanings of that posuk.
And therefore, if two disagree over the posuk's meaning--even if they agree
to the halachic outcomes--one of those dayanim is necessarily wrong.
The idea that each eilu has to be internally consistent and not involve
redundant derashos doesn't touch on the ve'eilu being internally consistent
and its set of derashos not being reduendant.
And therefore, two dayanim who darshen from two different pesuqim have the
same masqana, but are still in an eilu va'eilu because their sevaros cannot
be mutually asserted once we get down to the realm of pe'ulah, boolean logic
and "halakhah ke-". (According to Rashi.)
...
In Drasha #3, the Ran cites another teaching of Chazal and says they
darshaned that "even the words of he who /did not reach the emes/," were
all told to Moshe b'Sinai." (Still without mentioning the concept of 49
panim to each side, and not being as clear as the Tosefos Yom Tov about
whether Moshe transmitted this information to the people.) ...
...
When this topic revived, the chaburah in my Zoom room had just completed
that derashah. (We should be starting derashah 4 next week, btw. Thursday
nights at 8pm EST.) So, it was with this Ran in mind that I spoke up!
Among the topic we've repeatedly debated is the use of the word "emes". As
in:
working with the premises that (a) In any given case there is one true
halachic reality, and contradictory halachos cannot exist, and (b) Hashem
would not state that a falsehood is true; and evidently assuming the
premises that (c) It was not "they" but Hashem by Whom both the emes shita
and the sheker shita were told to Moshe, and (d) Hashem did not identify
the false shittos as such, the Ran proposes that although Hashem revealed
the future machlokos to Moshe, He did not reveal which shita was the emes.
Or, "emes" here means the din the rabbim will vote on to be din. Which
explains (d) why Hashem didn't reveal the rejected shitos. To do so would
raise bechirah chofshi problems, which is why Hashem never reveals things
that would tell the outcome of future human decisions. It also explains
why Hashem would give both shitos not just for informative reasons, but
"kulam meiroe'h echad nitnum" -- the non-emes answer is equally from Moshe.
In fact, the Ran emphasizes the importance of both shitos coming miPi
haGevurah via Moshe (which would be a problem if I took (b) at face
value). And then the hakra'ah that was left in the hands of people.
שכל התורה שבכתב ושבעל פה נמסרה למשה בסיני כמו שאמרו במגלה (דף יט) א"ר
חייא בר אבין אמר רבי יוחנן מאי דכתיב ועליהם ככל הדברים מלמד שהראהו
הקב"ה למשה כל דקדוקי תורה ודקדוקי סופרים ומה שסופרים עתידים לחדש
ומאי ניהו מקרא מגלה. דקדוקי סופרים הם המחלוקת וחלוקי סברות שבין חכמי
ישראל וכלן למדן מרע"ה מפי הגבורה. ושתהיה ההכרעה כפי הסכמת חכמי הדור.
R Shraga Simmons' translation (but I suggest the chevrah who got ???
for that quote see the original at the beginning of
https://www.sefaria.org/Derashot_HaRan.3.25 ):
All of the Torah both the written and the oral was given to Moses
on Sinai, as our sages have stated (Megillah 19b): "R. Chiyya b. Avin
said in the name of R. Yochanan: 'From the verse (Deuteronomy 9:13)
"and upon them according to all the words" we infer that the Holy
One Blessed be He showed Moses all of the Torah's deductions and
all of the scribes' deductions and what the scribes were destined
to originate, namely, the reading of the Megillah.'" "The scribes'
deductions are the disputes and differences of view among the
Torah scholars and all of them were taught to Moses our teacher,
may peace be upon him, by the Omnipotent One with the provision
that the decision be according to the consensus of the sages of the
respective generations.
Notice both opinions are called part of TSBP in the opening clause of
that quote. And that it's only the hakhra'ah via the consensus of the
chakhmei hador that differentiate them. Not that Hashem told Moshe all
the future wrong shitos.
...
In his Hebrew translation of the Judeo-Arabic Mevo HaTalmud by Rav Shmuel
ben Chofni Gaon, S. Abramson (Sinai 85, pp. 193-218) renders, by the words
penn and panim, the author's reference to scenarios or cases. So this would
mean that the angels, concerning each commandment in the Torah, showed
Moshe forty-nine scenarios that, because of the particular element in each
one, should be ruled permitted, and forty-nine scenarios each with a
particular element that effects prohibition...
Or, 49 scenarios in which shitah X should be the one the chakhamim
are machri'im, and 49 senarios for the other. You are taking panim to
mean mutually consistent ideas that can apply in different cases. But
the whole context is one of machloqes. I would therefor broaden the
whole discussion. These are different shitos that conflict, and in
different mileaus, the chakhmei hador may be makhri'im for one shitah or
the other one.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha