If a woman can say "you do not need to redeem me and I will not give you peros"

Avodah
1

Rav Zylberstein in the Cheshukei Chemed on Daf 78a of Kesubos discusses the
question as to whether a woman today who has lots of peros from her property
can say to her husband - "you do not need to redeem me, and I will not give
you the peros" - on the ground that the need for redemption today is not
common ("lo schiach") - even though the gemora there says that she cannot
avoid this trade as mandated by Chazal (despite her being able to avoid the
trade between mezonos versus ma'aseh yadeha, again a takana of Chazal, as
this last takana was done for her benefit).

Rav Zylberstein brings a discussion based on various rishonim to show that
actually, pidyon was not common even at the time of Chazal, or at the time
of the rishonim, and hence the fact that it is not common today does not
change the situation from that mandated by Chazal. He also adds in the
position of the Ran, that the takana regarding pidyon is not just made for
her benefit (as the mezonos one is) and hence something that can be waived
by her, but is also for the benefit of the husband, as without her
redemption, the husband doesn't have the benefit of her company and
services, while with mezonos that doesn't apply.

However, it seems to me that Rav Zylberstein is not in fact dealing with
what strikes me as the fundamental question. That is, it is not a question
of whether or not pidyon is not common today (indeed, I would be tempted
dispute that it is in fact "lo schiach", despite Rav Zylberstein taking this
for granted) - but rather that the job of pidyon today is one of those that
has been appropriated away from family members such as husbands, and is now
the province of governments.

The decision as to whether an individual may or may not be redeemed from
ISIS, or pirates off Africa, or wherever, is now one which governments take
with regard to their citizens. Governments which are prepared to do deals,
like France, redeem their citizens (albeit for astronomical sums).
Governments, like the UK and the US, who refuse to do deals on the grounds
that it just encourages terrorists - will not let individuals, including
husbands, redeem, even if the sums could be raised individually, as a matter
of general policy. Nobody assumed it was the job of Gilad Shalit's family
to effect his release - except to the extent that they was required to lobby
the Israeli government (it might even have been treason to go negotiating
with Hamas directly). Release or non release negotiations therefore,
including the price to be paid (whether by prisoner release or otherwise) is
today a government price.

So it seems to me that what in fact we have today is a situation where
husbands are, for the most part, forbidden by law (dina d'malchusa dina)
from redeeming their wives, ie from fulfilling their side of the takana of
Chazal. In such circumstances - while one might argue that the state of
which the woman is a citizen is entitled to (at least some portion of) the
peros (taxes?) the real question then seems to become: on what basis does
one say that the second half of the takana stands - not just in relation to
a woman who tries to say "you do not need to redeem me", but in relation to
any woman in this circumstance.

Has anybody come across anybody discussing this question, and any thoughts
on any justification for the retention of the husband's benefit if in fact
husbands are not legally allowed to effect redemption?

BTW on the question of the commonness of redemption - part of that would
depend on the scope of the definition of "pidyon". Clearly redemption from
ISIS or pirates in Africa falls within this category - but how about
rescuing somebody who was trekking in Nepal at the time of the earthquake?
Again this is something that governments are now regarded as having a
responsibility to do (the British Government has been criticised for failing
to do as much as others, such as the Israeli and US governments, have done).
At first blush I can't see why flying somebody out of an earthquake zone
would not fit within the pidyon definition - despite it being physical
forces, such as landslides, rather than people, who may be trapping the
individuals. How about a package tour company going bust? Again, the
person in question would (absent ATOL and similar travel bonding schemes set
up by the relevant governments) be trapped in a foreign country and need to
be returned to their country of origin, as per the language of the
takana/ketuba. So why would this not be a form of pidyon? But again, is
not the fundamental responsibility now assumed to devolve onto the
government in respect of its citizens? So while I am not actually sure that
it is true that pidyon is in fact so extremely not common, it seems to me
that the fundamental question is rather a different one.

Regards

Chana

2

It should be borne in mind that there are still countries (including ones
with substantial Jewish communities) where the need for pidyon is at least
as common now as it probably was in Chazal's day. Also that while in many
countries paying ransoms may be technically illegal, hardly anybody who is
r"l in that situation cares about this.

3

RZS writes:

It should be borne in mind that there are still countries (including ones
with substantial Jewish communities) where the need for pidyon is at least
as common now as it probably was in Chazal's day.

Are you thinking of South America? I confess that is what springs to mind
from your suggestion, although how often ransom is really required in such
countries I don't know.

Also that while in many countries paying ransoms may be technically

illegal, hardly anybody who is

r"l in that situation cares about this.

But presumably you are talking about the same ones (eg South America).

My question relates solely to countries, like Britain and Israel, to which
Rav Zylberstein was referring. He took it for granted that in fact it was
exceedingly uncommon for pidyon to be needed. I am not so sure it is so
uncommon, but I doubt very much that in these countries "hardly anybody who
is r"l in that situation cares about this". That is, while I know from the
press of numbers of cases in which pidyon has been needed for British and
Israeli citizens, in none of these cases were private individuals allowed to
redeem (despite them quite naturally wanting to, and possibly being willing
to do so, if they had not been restrained, whether by circumstances or
otherwise).

Clearly if one lives in a place where pidyon is common, and where, whatever
the technical law says, in practice individual family members redeem,
neither my question nor Rav Zylberstein's gets off the ground. But I don't
think the existence of a place in the world, that one would never
contemplate living in (and is not the locus of the ketuba), is relevant to
the obligations under that ketuba which must relate to the places that the
couple live and the governments under which they live. Even when it might
involve some less scrupulous situations - one of the mothers in our school
in England had the situation that her sons were effectively kidnapped by her
ex-husband and held in Russia. And while yes, ultimately she found where
they were hidden by means of a private investigator, which cost her private
money, she would never have been able to extract them had: (a) Russia not
signed up to the Hague convention; (b) the Russian court given judgment in
her favour; and (c) the Russian police at the bequest of the English
government on the basis of the Russian judgment actually going in and
retrieving the boys (whose location they had singularly failed to identify
until the private investigator had provided the cast iron information as to
where they were). And she would have struggled to have brought them back
into England without the rulings of the Russian authorities. And even if an
adult is different, I cannot see the British government allowing one of its
citizens to go off and try and attempt pidyon of another of its citizens
without its active involvement, it being seen as cutting across its foreign
policy (even if this was occurring in a place where ransom payments amongst
locals was common).

Zev Sero I have a right to stand on my own defence, if you

Regards

Chana

4

RZS writes:

It should be borne in mind that there are still countries (including ones
with substantial Jewish communities) where the need for pidyon is at least
as common now as it probably was in Chazal's day.

Are you thinking of South America?

Well, Latin America (so as to include Mexico). There are also other such
countries, such as India, the Philippines, Nigeria, where the need for
pidyon is common, but there are not a lot of Jews living there.

But I don't
think the existence of a place in the world, that one would never
contemplate living in (and is not the locus of the ketuba), is relevant to
the obligations under that ketuba which must relate to the places that the
couple live and the governments under which they live.

Even a couple marrying in such a country must contemplate the possibility
that one or both might one day travel to a country where kidnapping is common,
and be kidnapped. Even in Chazal's day the danger was not so much where people
lived as on the highways and the seas, where they might travel.

Also, I am not at all sure that it is actually illegal in most normal countries
to pay ransom. What is illegal is giving *anything* to groups that are officially
listed by that country's government as terrorists. If the kidnappers are not on
the list, so that it would be legal to give them a gift, then I don't think there's
a law against paying them ransom. (Perhaps there should be.)