Murder a Chok or Logically Compelling

Avodah
1

R' M Poppers provided the following -
"lo tirtzach" is a great example of r'tzon haBorei rather than of a
common-sense law -- as quoted b'sheim RYDS/the Rav z'l' (see

> https://www.torahmusings.com/2018/02/chukim-mishpatim-no-difference/),

Where this illustration is offered
people stranded on a boat, where rescue is most unlikely. All will die of
starvation unless they kill one (or one volunteers - would it be a Mitzvah
for this person to kill themselves?) and the others will survive by
consuming this person's flesh.
Logic concludes that since they're anyway going to die, they ought to
choose life by randomly choosing one to kill.
Torah however rules that this is prohibited as murder, a gezeirat ha’katuv.

How do we know this is the Toirah ruling?
It is clear from Rashi (74a near the bottom of the page) Mai Chazis; "what
makes your blood redder than the other fellow's" that HKBH sees no
difference between one life or the other, the prohibition of murder is the
same be it a Rosh Yeshivah or an Am HaArets. However, it is clear that in
the eyes of HKBH, the death of two is worse than the death of one. If
however, the enforcer is threatening to kill him and his family unless he
kills the target, the Halacha is that he kills the target.

Sefaria
https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.74a.20?lang=bi&with=Rashi
Gemara asks: *From where do we* derive this *halakha* with regard to *a
murderer himself,* that one must allow himself to be killed rather than
commit murder? The Gemara answers: *It is* based on *logical reasoning*
that one life is not preferable to another, and therefore there is no need
for a verse to teach this *halakha*. The Gemara relates an incident to
demonstrate this: *As* when *a certain person came before Rabba and said to
him: The lord of my place,* a local official, *said to me: Go kill
so-and-so, and if not I will kill you, what shall I do? Rabba said to him:
It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. Who is to
say that your blood is redder than his, that your life is worth more than
the one he wants you to kill? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. This
logical reasoning is the basis for the halakha that one may not save his
own life by killing another.*
Rashi
https://www.sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.74a.20?lang=bi&with=Rashi
my translation
It is logically compelling because either way there is loss of only one
life [DeLeKa Ellah Chada Ibbud Neshamah] and the sin of murder, so he may
not transgress; because the Toirah [although it usually] commands that we
transgress in order to live [VaCahy Bahem] this is because HKBH values the
life of a Yid. However, here, since there is anyway a loss of a Y's life,
why might it be permitted to murder? Who can say that HKBH loves one life
more than another? Therefore, HKBHs command may not be transgressed.

BTW if childbirth presents with complications that jeopardizes the mother's
life, we save the m by killing the baby because the baby is not yet a
'life'.
However, once the baby is born, i.e. most of the head has emerged, it is a
'life' and we may not make the decision of which life to save, the b or the
m.
However, it would appear from Rashi [and I do not know if this is possible]
if both babies have emerged, it is now a Q of saving one or two lives, we
save two lives.
Are cojoined babies with two heads one or two lives?

2

Where this illustration is offered
people stranded on a boat, where rescue is most unlikely. All will die of
starvation unless they kill one (or one volunteers - would it be a Mitzvah
for this person to kill themselves?) and the others will survive by
consuming this person's flesh.

Logic concludes that since they're anyway going to die, they ought to
choose life by randomly choosing one to kill.
Torah however rules that this is prohibited as murder, a gezeirat ha'katuv.

You're thinking like a Consequentialist, that ethical decisions are based
on which gives the most ethical outcome.

But the famous / infamous Troley Problem and its variants are all about
showing the limitations of Consequentialism.

What I think is a more obvious example: A surgeon has 5 patients who
will die if they don't get transplants. Should she go out in the street
and kill an innocent healthy person for their organs to save 5? I mean,
net-net, the world would be ahead 4 lives!

The Torah more deontological, where morality is based on whether or not
rules followed.

So far, I thought of two ways to think about the gemara about a whole
group dying rather than turning in one of the group (unless he is
chayav misah, like Sheva ben Bikhri).

The compring infinities approach:
If human life or happiness are of infinite value, then 5 people aren't
more valuable than one. It's infinity either way.

Or the Bitachon approach:
All human beings can do is act. It's up to HQBH how things turn out. So,
morality depends on the choice of action. As outcome is never entirely
one's choice.

But as someone who wants more Tenu'as haMussar in the world, I would
argue that the Torah has a Virtue Ethic. The moral choice is one that
is consistent with expressing and reinforcing the right virtues (Middos).
Which would also get you to a more Deontological approach.

...

Are cojoined babies with two heads one or two lives?

Menachos 37a:
    Pelimo asked Rabbi: "If a person has two heads, on which should he
    place his tefillin?"

    He said to him: "Either get up and go to exile, or accept upon
    yourself excommunication."

    In the meantime, a man came by and said: "A child was born to me
    with two heads. How much do I have to pay to the kohen [ie one pidyon
    haben or two]?"

Tosafos (ad loc, "o qum gali") quotes a Medrash Rabba, in which Ashmodai
presents Shelomo haMelekh with a man with two heads. He marries, and
some of the couple's children have one had, and some two. Shelomo gets
the case when the man died, There was a fight over the yerushah where
the two headed sons wanted the inheritance to be divided by head, giving
them two portions each. Shelomo blindfolds one head and put hot water on
the other. If both heads felt the pain, they were counted as one person.

Whether or not that answers your question depends on whether you assume
midrashim necessarily conform to halakhah. An aggadita vs halakhah thing.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

3

Where Baruch is threatening the life of Aharon
even if only inadvertently [he is standing on his air supply line]
Baruch is a Rodef
and must be killed.

Where the threat is from a third party
The third party is the Rodef - but we are unable to neutralise that Rodef
Rava Paskens, since in HKBHs eyes no one Js life is more valuable than
another
one may not kill EVEN in order to save their own life
and KVeChomer no outsider can kill
[so this is a LOGICAL argument, Lamah Li Kera Sevara Hu, it is NOT a Chok]

TTBOMKnowledge, this is the Halacha
And was presented in order to challenge the proposition
That Halacha, HKBHs commands, CAN runs contrary to common sense
As is illustrated by the ruling
That two lives are NOT more valuable than one

I do not understand why or how it is related,
but R Micha argued/presented the illustration of
A surgeon who can save 5 people
by randomly selecting and killing an uninvolved person
[which is clearly wrong, no?]
Thereby proving that we cannot simply argue
that the best outcome for the most people
Is the right choice

I do not suspect that anyone in the discussion proposed or entertained such
a thought
and the reason is because
The random person is UNINVOLVED
And it is self evident [Sevara, Lama Li Kera]
That it is utterly untenable that we randomly grab someone to save the life
of many.
And that is why I do not understand why R Micha made a reference to that
illustration.

R Micha added that Halacha presents a different subflavor of Deontology,
called
Virtue Ethics. i.e. that our primary concern is Middos Tovos ("virtues').

I do not understand this
As Rashi explains this case, Halacha determines the value of a Y life in
the eyes of HKBH
is the same be that Yid a RoshY or a Shoteh
I do not readily see how that relates to Middos Tovos.

As for deontology - ethical choice following rules - and its subflavours
I do not understand why this has anything to do with ethics

Our ethics are determined by being loyal to HKBH
Rava expresses that best by ruling that the life of a famous Rosh Yeshivah
Is no more valuable in the eyes of HKBH than the life of
an illiterate Y street sweeper
Or brain injured paraplegic.

R Micha also presents
Every Y life has infinite value,
Certainly, this is the foundation of Rava’s Pesak – the RY and the brain
injured paraplegic

4

The third party is the Rodef - but we are unable to neutralise that Rodef
Rava Paskens, since in HKBHs eyes no one Js life is more valuable than
another
one may not kill EVEN in order to save their own life
and KVeChomer no outsider can kill
[so this is a LOGICAL argument, Lamah Li Kera Sevara Hu, it is NOT a Chok]

TTBOMKnowledge, this is the Halacha
And was presented in order to challenge the proposition
That Halacha, HKBHs commands, CAN runs contrary to common sense

That halakhah doesn't assume a Consequentialist system of ethics.

It does indeed make sense. Once you accept any of the numerous arguments
proof that having the best outcome for the most people is not the best
moral code.

As you put it about third parties... Damage or boon caused by third parties
isn't about you making the right choice, it's about those third parties doing
so. Which presumes a Deontological ethics -- one in which the morality of
a choice depends on the rules of behavior themselves more so than outcomes.

In my first post on this discussion I posed three possible reasons why halakhah
would be deontological. And they are not mutually exclusive. In short:
1- Every moment of human life is of infinite value, and one cannot compare
infinities.
2- People act. But Hashem controls outcomes.
3- Our whole purpose in olam hazeh is to refine souls. And thus the
world is made (see answers 1 or 2) such that our choices matter more
than their outcomes. #3 argues for Virtue Ethics in particular. But then,
so does all the attention paid to Middos.

I do not understand why or how it is related,

Perhaps google the terms I introduced: Consequentialism, Deontology, and
Virtue Ethics. Clearly my attempts to define them aren't working for you.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha