RYBS's Talk on Hafkaas Kiddushin, Talmud Torah and Kabala s Ol Malchus Shamayim

Avodah
1

[RAK gives credit to others in fn. 1. It is not his transcript. -micha]

R' Micha Berger posted R' Ari Kahn's transcript of Rav YB Soloveitchik:

                                  ... This is not a psychological
fact; it is an existential fact, which is due not to the inferior
status of the woman, but rather to the difference, the basic
distinction, between the female personality and the male personality.
Loneliness frightens the woman, and an old spinster's life is much
more miserable and tragic than the life of an old bachelor. This was
true in antiquity; it is still true, and it will be true a thousand
years from now. So, to say that tan du mil'meisiv armalo was or
is due to the inferior political or social status of the woman
is simply misinterpreting the chazaka tan du mil'meisiv armalo. ...

From what I understand, the objection to hafkaas kiddushin comes from a
presumption that a woman would prefer to stay with her husband, even if
he seems to be a terrible person, and even if she tells us that in *her*
opinion he is a terrible person -- and we have this presumption because
of the chazaka of tan du.

But I do not see Rav Soloveitchik making that case here. All he is saying
is that "an old spinster's life is much more miserable and tragic than
the life of an old bachelor."

He does say that this relative perspective on singlehood is a "permanent
ontological principle[s] rooted in the very depth of the human
personality," and that it will never change, and that this information
is Revealed in the words of Bereishis. But this refers ONLY to the misery
and tragedy of a single woman as opposed to a single man.

And that's NOT that argument against hafkaas kiddushin, at least not
how I've heard it. The argument that I've heard -- that is to say, the
supposed translation of "tav l'meisiv tan du" -- is that a woman would
prefer living with ANY man rather than to be alone.

I can easily understand opposition to Hafkaas Kiddushin on the grounds
that widespread use would give *all* marriages a sort of "tentative"
status. But that's not what people are referring to here, right? When
they invoke "tan du" against Hafkaas Kidushin, they're saying that despite
the wife's protestations, the wife would actually prefer to stay married,
and that's why they're unable to annul the marriage. Or am I mistaken?

Akiva Miller

2

  From what I understand, the objection to hafkaas kiddushin comes from a
presumption that a woman would prefer to stay with her husband, even if
he seems to be a terrible person, and even if she tells us that in*her*
opinion he is a terrible person -- and we have this presumption because
of the chazaka of tan du.

What she prefers is irrelevant. Obviously she wants to leave her husband;
she is openly telling us so, and it's ridiculous to suppose she is not
telling the truth. And even if she weren't, if the marriage is invalid
then it's invalid, no matter what she wants.

You're looking at the whole thing from the wrong direction. No objection
is needed to annulling a marriage; what's needed is grounds *for* annulling
it. The alleged grounds are that it has now become clear that this man
was always such a bad person that had the woman known this when he proposed
marriage she would have refused, and throughout the subsequent marriage
there was never a point at which she was so happy that had she found out
the truth she would have consented to stay with him.

Now if the husband is bad enough (and it can be proved that he always was so),
*and* the woman is such a catch that there was never a point at which she
could not have found another husband, then this makes sense. Obviously she
has always preferred a good husband to a bad one, and only married this man
because she thought he was a good one. But what if refusing to marry him,
or leaving him at some point during the marriage, were to expose her to the
risk of remaining single forever? Would she still have turned him down or
left him? The proponents of annulment say yes, of course she would, just
as she has left him now. But, RYBS says, Chazal tell us that it's female
nature to prefer a bad husband to none at all, so perhaps even if she had
known the truth about this man she would have consented to marry him rather
than risk remaining single; or perhaps there was a point after the event at
which, had she learned the truth, she would have stayed with him rather than
face a single future.

But I do not see Rav Soloveitchik making that case here. All he is saying
is that "an old spinster's life is much more miserable and tragic than
the life of an old bachelor."

Yes, and therefore while a man might prefer to be single rather than live with
a bad wife, a similarly situated woman will not. That this woman *now* tells
us she would, doesn't prove that she always would have.

He does say that this relative perspective on singlehood is a "permanent
ontological principle[s] rooted in the very depth of the human
personality," and that it will never change, and that this information
is Revealed in the words of Bereishis. But this refers ONLY to the misery
and tragedy of a single woman as opposed to a single man.

And that's NOT that argument against hafkaas kiddushin, at least not
how I've heard it. The argument that I've heard -- that is to say, the
supposed translation of "tav l'meisiv tan du" -- is that a woman would
prefer living with ANY man rather than to be alone.

Yes. How is that not the same thing? Spinsterhood is terrible for women,
so terrible that they'd prefer living with a bad man to it.

When they invoke "tan du" against Hafkaas Kidushin, they're saying that despite
the wife's protestations, the wife would actually prefer to stay married,
and that's why they're unable to annul the marriage. Or am I mistaken?

Not that she'd prefer it now, but that she did prefer it earlier, when she
was faced with the risk of never finding anyone else.

3

: From what I understand, the objection to hafkaas kiddushin comes from a
: presumption that a woman would prefer to stay with her husband, even if
: he seems to be a terrible person, and even if she tells us that in *her*
: opinion he is a terrible person -- and we have this presumption because
: of the chazaka of tan du.

You phrased it as a psychological issue. RYBS says it's something
existential or ontological -- and explicitly NOT pschological. I think
he is saying that this vector exists in every woman's character. Even
when current social reality provides other vectors that may submerge tav
lemeisiv tan du, it is an entity present in her psyche (ontologically)
still shaping her perception of reality (existential).

And because of that element of her soul, inherited from Chavah, it's very
hard to ever call a marriage a complete meqach ta'us on the bride's part.

But again, my impression from RAL which is reinforced by this
transcript, this particular argument was a side-bar, not RYBS's
primary argument. Eg:
...
: I can easily understand opposition to Hafkaas Kiddushin on the grounds
: that widespread use would give *all* marriages a sort of "tentative"
: status. But that's not what people are referring to here, right? ...

RYBS discusses that issue at greater length than this one anyway.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

4

R' Joseph Kaplan asked:

"We must not tamper, not only with the halachos, but even with
the chazakos, for the chazakos of which chazal spoke rest not
upon transient psychological behavioral patterns, but upon
permanent ontological principles rooted in the very depth of
the human personality, in the metaphysical human personality,
which is as changeless as the heavens above."

Can anybody explain what this really means? That is, explain it
to someone who doesn’t use the word "ontological" in his/her
normal speech. I have read it many many times but I still
don’t understand what the Rav is saying.

This is how I understand it:

Just as a leopard cannot change its spots, and just as Shabbos comes each week whether society accepts it or not, so too, there are certain elements of the human condition which Chazal have identified as inherent and unchanging, not subject to variation by time, place, or culture.

Or something like that. At any rate, one can agree or disagree about whether this assertion is true, and even among those who agree with it, there might be discussion of exactly which chazakos are unchanging and which are variable. Still, his point is that there are indeed some UNchanging aspects.

Akiva Miller

5

This is how I understand it:

Just as a leopard cannot change its spots, and just as Shabbos comes each week whether society accepts it or not, so too, there are certain elements of the human condition which Chazal have identified as inherent and unchanging, not subject to variation by time, place, or culture.

Or something like that. At any rate, one can agree or disagree about whether this assertion is true, and even among those who agree with it, there might be discussion of exactly which chazakos are unchanging and which are variable. Still, his point is that there are indeed some UNchanging aspects.

Akiva Miller